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The biggest risk to the effectiveness of ongoing Technical Assistance (TA) programmes 
(as a result of a change in government) is a change in priority or policy by the incoming 
administration. Indeed, periods of transition usually see the passing of a diverse set of 
economic and social policies that may affect ongoing development programmes. The World Bank 
(2007), for instance, notes that about 85% of economic reforms take place within 15 months of a 
change of government. Donor flexibility is, therefore, of particular importance in circumstances of 
government change in programme countries.1 
The existing (limited) evidence shows that the change of government generally has a 
negative effect on the effectiveness of ongoing TA programmes – especially when the new 
government has different priorities (which can often be the case for an incoming opposition 
party). However, in some cases, a new administration – despite some policy differences from its 
predecessor – may see an ongoing TA programme as helpful and may decide to continue 
supporting it in its exiting form. In such cases, there may not be an adverse impact/shock on the 
effectiveness of TA programmes (see Sections 3 and 4). 
This rapid literature review has detected the severe lack of academic studies and 
dedicated synthesis on the topic.2 However, several project reviews (intermediate or final) by 
donors and independent programme reviewers give a passing mention (a paragraph or two) of 
the high risk to programme effectiveness from government change in partner countries. In this 
regard, the academic community (or research departments of major development institutions) 
may fill a valuable research gap if they systematically explore the issue. 
Some evidence on how change of governments in programme countries affects the effectiveness 
of TA is summarised below: 
 The TA component of the ‘Punjab Education Sector Programme’ has faced sustainability 
challenges from the new administration (that won the 2018 Pakistan general elections) 
since it showed low political will and ownership towards the programme. 
 A USAID evaluation of TA for local M&E capacity building in Peru has shown that the 
national M&E networks and institutions are vulnerable to instability rendered by changes 
in government – as was evident from the 2016 Peruvian general election.  
 Evidence from TA programmes in Guatemala have shown that TA effectiveness may be 
negatively affected by programme delays, changing/conflicting priorities of ministries and 
government departments, and a complicated political environment – in the event of 
change in government (e.g. 2011 Guatemalan general election). 
 Following a change of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g. general elections in 
October 2010), USAID’s Country Development Cooperation programme and its TA 
components faced considerable risk from constitutional and political instabilities. 
                                                   
1 https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/_508_securing-the-future.pdf 
2 This rapid literature review follows on from ‘The Effectiveness of Technical Assistance in Middle Income 
Countries’ by Megersa (2019). 
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 Evidence from TA components in DFID’s regional business innovation programme 
(namely, ‘Innovative Ventures and Technologies for Development’ in South Asia and 
East Africa) as well as German Bilateral Technical Cooperation in different Latin America 
and Caribbean countries shows that changes of governments (and the ensuing political 
instabilities and shifting government priorities) may impact TA effectiveness. 
 Conversely, an evaluation of the ‘Advancing National Integration’ programme in Georgia 
by USAID claimed that the change of government in 2012 has had no observable effect 
on project effectiveness. Further, a change of government in Ghana in 2000 has had a 
positive effect on the effectiveness of ‘Parliamentary Strengthening’ capacity 
enhancement (TA) programme – even if the usual post-election political instabilities were 
observed (e.g. laying-off senior public servants by incoming administration). 
 
The following sections of this brief report are structured as follows. Section 2 provides a concise 
account of the scientific literature – especially as it relates to the link between government 
change, political instability and aid effectiveness. Section 3 provides specific examples where 
changes in governments affected national Technical Assistance programmes (or specific 
Technical Assistance components of broad country programmes by donors).3 The section 
provides some eight examples of such instances from Middle Income Countries (MICs) in South 
Asia, Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. Section 4 provides two more similar examples –
focusing on regional TA programmes. 
 
2. Change of government and TA: Evidence from the broad 
literature 
There is an established body of literature examining the link between change of 
governments and/or political instability, vis-à-vis policy uncertainty or reforms, and how 
this affects economic growth. However, the literature does not explicitly explore the 
effects on Technical Assistance (TA) programmes. Nonetheless, it is correct to assume that 
changing government priorities and policies will affect programme effectiveness (see Section 3 
and 4).  
Research shows that lack of continuity in policies, changing government priorities, and political 
instabilities (e.g. linked to changes in governments and severe divisions among political groups) 
creates uncertainties that adversely affect programme effectiveness and economic development 
(Batten, 2011; Joseph, 2015). 
Chauvet and Guillaumont (2003) stress that aid effectiveness in general depends on 
political stability. They hypothesise that the effectiveness of aid (in the form of TA or other 
modalities) may be affected by political instability in two opposite directions. Political instability 
could be seen as economic vulnerability (i.e. as an exogenous negative shock) that is likely to be 
compensated (or insured) by foreign aid. But because this instability is political rather than 
                                                   
3 Some of the programmes covered in this report are not solely TA – but also broader country and regional 
programmes that have a TA component to address specific objectives. 
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economic and internal rather than external, its effects are less likely to be rewarded by a 
resource inflow. It seems more likely that political instability works in the opposite direction and 
negatively impacts effectiveness. The authors note that in a troubled political environment, with 
violence, frequently changing governments, coups d’état, riots, etc. – aid (be it TA or other) may 
hardly contribute to growth. 
Changes in government may at times have positive effects on the effectiveness of TA 
programmes. This is especially the case where the transition is part of a normal democratic 
process, and the programme is favourable to the new government too (e.g. see Section 3.6). 
Unsurprisingly, some of the positive cases associated to change in government are on TA and 
capacity building programmes focused on democratisation, parliamentary support, external 
advice on elections processes etc. (Simpson and Park, 2013; World Bank, 2004). 
It is worth mentioning that ‘uncertainties’ and ‘risks’ tied to change in government – in 
some rare occasions – may emanate not only on the side of TA recipient countries, but 
also from donors. Seldomly, new administrations of donor nations may have different priorities 
and philosophies, and this may affect longer-term TA programmes. For instance, the change of 
government in 2013 brought considerable changes to Australian government aid policy. The aid 
budget was cut repeatedly. AusAID, the Australian Government’s aid agency, was fully 
integrated into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Government policy statements also 
stated the arrival of a ‘New Aid Paradigm’, an augmented focus on economic diplomacy, and a 
new push for innovation in the Australian aid programme (Wood et al., 2017). Cliff (1993) also 
notes that a change of donor government or policy may sometimes cause cancellation of funds 
to specific aid (e.g. TA) programmes.4 
Lastly, the link between change of government, and political instability, reforms, and 
economic growth has been investigated by notable and seminal studies in the field of 
political economy (e.g.  Alesina et al. 1992; Barro 1991) and many other follow-up studies. For 
instance, regarding uncertainties in government policies following transitions of power, Bates and 
Krueger (1993)5 note that a change of government may lead to reforms (i.e. changes in policy), 
which may not have happened if exiting governments were to continue in power. They note that 
this is because reforms carry uncertainty about the future size and distribution of the benefits of 
reform. Duncan (2011) and Bates and Krueger (1993) argue that the status quo (e.g. existing 
policies and administrative apparatus) are likely to be maintained if the costs of a reform are 
more immediate and concentrated.  
However, due to its lack of explicit focus on TA or donor programmes, the above line of 
academic literature will not be discussed further. The overall conclusion is, however, that 
                                                   
4 In some cases, a change in government (when favourably viewed by the donor) may see additional 
commitment from the donor – thus, guiding the overall country programme and effectiveness of specific 
outcomes in a positive direction. For instance, after a change of government in Guatemala in 1954, the US 
government poured almost USD 20 million into aid programmes to that country. United States economic and TA 
programmes to Guatemala predate 1945, and these programmes deal with education, agricultural extension, and 
public health (Weaver, 1970). 
5 Bates and Krueger (1993), who investigated the history of economic reform, studied eight developing countries 
- some of which had been successful reformers (e.g. Chile and the Republic of Korea), some which had been 
reasonably successful (e.g. Ghana and Turkey), and others that had little success with reform despite several 
attempts (e.g. Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, and Zambia). 
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these (political and economic) factors are interlinked. The following sections of this review 
will be dedicated to discussing specific examples of changes in government, and how they 
affected ongoing respective TA programmes. 
3. Case Studies: National TA Programmes & change of 
government 
3.1 Pakistan: Punjab Education Sector Programme II (PESP II) 
Description of TA programme (PESP, 2017; PESP, 2019):     
PESP II provides TA to Pakistan’s School Education Department (SED) and its affiliated 
agencies, to support capacity building and institutional strengthening. The current (second 
phase) of the TA programme will run until 31 March 2020 (being managed by Cambridge 
Education (CE)). In addition, PESP II provided TA to support the Chief Minister’s Education 
Reform Roadmap though McKinsey and Company. Further, PESP II provided TA to SED through 
an Externally Financed Output (EFO) agreement with the World Bank (GBP808,092, Jan 2017 to 
Dec 2018). The EFO was designed to align TA, and to strengthen collaboration between PESP II 
and the World Bank’s Education Sector Project across areas that are not covered by other DFID 
or World Bank TA programmes.   
Effect of Change in Government on TA (PESP, 2017; PESP 2019):     
According to DFID, the results “substantially did not meet expectations” regarding 
programme milestone on indicator ‘2.2’ of the Business Case, i.e. “Improved reporting, analysis 
and dissemination of PEC exam results” (PESP, 2019).     
With the change of government (following the 2018 Pakistan general elections), the new 
Punjab Examination Commission (PEC) Board was being reconstituted and the staffing 
plan needs re-approval. The Chief Minister directed that the staffing plan may be placed before 
the committee headed by Chief Secretary, Punjab. PEC is reviewing the staffing plan which will 
then be submitted to the Secretary SED for onward submission to the Chief Secretary for 
approval. As the plan is still being finalised and implementation has not begun, this milestone is 
off course. 
TA has supported PEC to develop an Assessment Policy Framework which was shared with 
a variety of different stakeholders including District Education Authorities (DEAs) for feedback - in 
addition to the organisational development plan. Certain key policy recommendations made 
therein have been adopted by the new government, and DFID TA continues to support the 
education department in the implementation of these recommendations.  
There is a risk around top political will and ownership of education reforms, particularly 
following the change of government.  However, the education department led by the Minister 
and new Secretary are leading the reforms with considerable momentum. DFID also noted that it 
continuously engages with the Minister and Secretary Education to keep the reforms momentum 
going, besides advocating for a restart of stocktake process with the top political leadership. 
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3.2 Peru: Strengthening M&E capacity 
Description of TA programme (USAID, 2018a):   
Capacity building intervention and evaluation activity is supplied by USAID/Peru with monitoring 
and evaluation services, and assistance to execute the USAID Evaluation Policy. Its goal was to 
encourage evidence-based programming by undertaking studies and evaluations and by 
contributing to the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) capacities of USAID and its local 
implementing partners (IPs).  
The ‘activity’/programme was organised into three areas of support:  
1. Design and implement both impact and performance evaluation studies and conduct 
assessments supporting USAID programmes;  
2. Provide performance M&E TA, and capacity building for USAID Peru, its implementing 
partners, and host country government counterparts, and  
3. Strengthen the capacity of local evaluation institutions to design and implement 
evaluation studies and assessments according to international standards.  
Effect of Change in Government on TA (USAID, 2018a):   
Peruvian M&E networks are vulnerable to destabilisation (including from changes in 
government). The Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations (MIMP) has been acting as a 
sponsoring public institution by providing resources for the management of the Peruvian Network 
of Monitoring and Evaluation (PERUME).  
A change of government (after the 2016 Peruvian general election) upset plans to have the 
network transferred to Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion of Peru (Ministerio de 
Desarrollo e Inclusión Social de Perú - MIDIS). The resulting ambiguous status of PERUME (with 
MIMP) is wearing down its leadership, which has slowed down its development and activities. It is 
also suffering from the loss of its international affiliate, the M&E Network in Latin America & the 
Caribbean (REDLACME), a regional network that endorsed them and that has now become part 
of Community of Practice on Management for Development Results in the Latin America & the 
Caribbean region (COPLAC). Notwithstanding these obstacles, PERUME network members 
indicate that they consider the network as remaining relevant and intend to analyse their 
institutional situation when reviewing their strategic plan. 
3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina: USAID Country Development 
Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) 2012-2016 
Description of TA programme (USAID, 2012a):     
Through its country development cooperation, the USAID is the main donor currently involved in 
energy policy reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in collaboration with TA from UNDP and GIZ, 
while other donors, notably the EU and World Bank, are concentrating on such areas as energy 
efficiency legislation (EU) and power distribution upgrades (WB). 
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Likewise, in the economic policy area, USAID has partnerships with key government institutions 
and the private sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Particular, USAID has been the lead donor 
in reforms in the financial sector. This resulted in Bosnia and Herzegovina having one of the 
steadiest banking systems in the region. USAID has also been the lead donor in important 
reforms in fiscal policy (e.g. direct tax reform), public finance management, and energy. 
It is noted that bigger investment, particularly in the energy sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(not least because of USAID’s capacity building and Technical Assistance programmes) will lead 
to greater electricity trade and exports, which will directly contribute to a reduced trade deficit and 
improved macroeconomic stability for the country.  
Effect of Change in Government on TA (USAID, 2012a):   
Bosnia and Herzegovina had general elections in October 2010. Understanding the 
implications of the government change on its programmes, USAID (2012a) noted that it will 
continually examine political will and traction in economic policy reforms to decide whether 
certain sectors, such as banking and energy policy, continue to progress and merit ongoing TA.  
The energy sector epitomises substantial economic opportunity for Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
builds on past USAID investments and accomplishments, but it requires strong host country 
commitment. Similarly, the financial sector is a priority area for USAID assistance due to the 
following:  
 financial sector performance greatly affects productivity growth (the sector is critical to 
mobilise savings and channel domestic and international private capital to support 
productivity growth); and  
 future investments in the financial sector will capitalise on previous USAID investments 
and achievements and ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina meets its IMF 
commitments.6  
USAID’s support in the financial sector is concentrated on the banking sector, given that this is 
an area where the greatest demand for assistance existed in the country – e.g. because of the 
risk that a bank-centric financial system in Bosnia and Herzegovina carries. 
While listing major risks in Bosnia and Herzegovina (which are partly linked to change in 
government – as a cause or consequence), USAID notes that the Constitutional Reform 
process is delayed or stalled; nationalistic propaganda further divides the reform agenda; 
growing youth dissatisfaction feeds into nationalistic rhetoric and deters the reconciliation 
process, and Bosnia and Herzegovina fails to implement prudent and responsible fiscal 
consolidation measures and policy.  
                                                   
6 The IMF (2010; p12) Article IV Reviews Report specifically stresses the role that USAID plays in fostering a 
single economic space in the financial sector, noting that “the banking agencies are receiving TA from USAID as 
part of a multistage programme to gradually adopt risk-based supervision and move to Basel II, which will help 
harmonise supervisory practices and regulations.” 
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3.4 Guatemala: Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems 
Description of TA programme (USAID, 2012b):     
The goal of the Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems (SPS) Technical Assistance 
programme in Guatemala was to raise awareness of infection prevention and to reduce the 
rate of nosocomial infections in Ministry of Health (MoH) facilities, thereby contributing to an 
improved quality of care in these health facilities. 
Drawing from experiences and lessons learned in African Countries, Rational Pharmaceutical 
Management (RPM) Plus programme cooperated with the Guatemala MoH Hospital Technical 
Assistance Unit to deliver TA (i.e. implement the approach) in five pilot hospitals in Guatemala: 
Amatitlan, Coatepeque, Escuintla, Quetzaltenango, and Quiche. The successful pilot was 
conducted in 2007 and 2008, supported by the RPM Plus programme, and financed by USAID.  
It used regional infectious disease funds through the South American Infectious Disease Initiative 
(SAIDI) and core Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) funds. As a result of the pilot, the Vice Ministry 
of Hospitals (VMH) of MoH decided to adopt the standardised approach to advance Infection 
control (IC) practices in its 43-hospital network by using a Guatemalan version of the tool, as well 
as to update the MoH IC protocols.  
From the outset of the TA to the VMH, it was agreed that the follow-up and monitoring would be 
provided by the hospital coordinators from the VMH. They are responsible for supervision of the 
hospitals, with TA from Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems (SPS) programme.  
Effect of Change in Government on TA (USAID, 2012b):   
MoH was key in moving TA activities forward and was the driving force behind the activities in 
both the VMH and in the Comprehensive Health Care System (Sistema Integral de Atencion de 
Salud – SIAS).  
However, there were many delays in activity progress, due primarily to conflicting 
priorities of MoH and the complicated political environment at the time of implementation: 
and change of government (following 2011 Guatemalan general election). 
However, despite these impediments, the VMH was able to mobilise the hospital IC committees 
to apply the modules of the Infection control assessment tool (ICAT) and maintain momentum for 
three annual evaluations. The delays introducing the monitoring indicators meant that SPS failed 
to support that process. 
 
3.5 Honduras: National Vision (2010-38) & National Plan (2010-22) 
Description of TA programme (USAID, 2018b):     
The Government of Honduras (GOH) National Vision and National Plan emphasises 
economic growth and job creation, providing an overarching and consistent platform to 
support planning and coordination through 2038. The GOH, the private sector, and donor-funded 
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programmes are making inroads in terms of improving employment planning, expanding 
employment access, and guaranteeing relevant employability and skills training.  
Key donors – such as the EU, Canada, and USAID – are making significant investments in 
employment growth, including policy and technical support for improved systems and 
institutions at the national level as well as direct TA in Honduras (especially within 
western Honduras). The Vision prioritises the western region in particular, because of its high 
level of poverty and the concentration of the Lenca and Maya Ch’ortí indigenous groups in the 
area. 
Even if the National Plan currently has gaps in terms of transparency and clarity of implementation, 
it offers a basic vision; has identified priority sectors and enjoys legitimacy within the private sector 
space. The Honduran Secretariat of Labour is prioritising legal reforms to encourage 
entrepreneurship and access to credit; promoting Small and Medium Enterprise Business 
Development Centers (CDE-MIPYMEs) as local small business incubators; and is working to 
launch and institutionalise employment offices providing a range of services to job-seekers 
throughout the country, including in western Honduras.  
The CDE-MIPYMEs provide TA and training for MSMEs and offer significant potential to 
channel support to young entrepreneurs. The private sector is working closely with the 
government through the Plan Honduras 20/20, which intends to create 600,000 jobs in priority 
sectors of the economy - an effort that would be dented only by public and private sector capacity 
to build the skills needed for these new jobs. 
Honduran Coffee Institute (Instituto Hondureño del Cafe - IHCAFE) advocates for continued 
improvement and prosperity in the coffee sector in Honduras. IHCAFE represents over 100,000 
coffee-producing families, providing TA, training, and research and development services. 
IHCAFE trains coffee producers through mass media and direct extension and training services 
such as meetings, workshops, field days and informal talks. IHCAFE also provides TA to 
producers in the establishment of nurseries, crop management, integrated pest management, 
crop nutrition and fertilisation, tissue management, wet and dry processing, storage, specialty 
coffee, marketing, and identification and development of markets.  
Effect of Change in Government on TA (USAID, 2018b):   
The Vision and National Plan are Honduras’ key development plans, providing a clear framework 
for national development. The Vision comprises of a 28-year period. Thus, to guarantee 
continuity across Presidential administrations, an innovative and progressive move is 
required. As USAID notes, this will be important in a country that has traditionally 
dismantled the entire public service system with each successive presidential election.  
The National Plan has been decentralised.  Regional coordinators located throughout the 
country, who represent the central government, coordinate actions related to the plan’s key 
pillars across local actors within the departments and municipalities under their view. 
Nevertheless, local stakeholders said that during the change of government in 2013, the 
National Plan went from being a Secretariat-level coordinating body to a lesser 
dependency of the Office of the Presidency. This reduced its legitimacy and budget and 
has made it difficult to coordinate National Plan-related activities.  
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Further, according to high-level stakeholders from the private sector, the National Plan was not 
developed in close coordination with the private sector or civil society, so buy-in is weak. 
 
3.6 Ghana: Capacity Enhancement Program (Parliamentary 
Strengthening) 
Description of TA programme (World Bank, 2004):   
World Bank Institute (WBI) and the Parliamentary Centre of Canada (by collaborating with 
Ghana’s Institute of Economic Affairs) ran a capacity enhancement programme, whose objective 
was to provide practical advice to MPs on the budget process and relate it to the wider economic 
reform programme, to update and streamline Ghana’s public sector.  
This multiyear capacity enhancement programme (running since 1990s) was complementary to 
other broader Technical Assistance programmes. It supplemented broader governance reforms, 
such as that of World Bank’s Public Financial Management Reform and Financial Management 
Technical Assistance projects. These TA (or capacities building) programmes intended to 
promote, among others, greater government accountability.  
Effect of Change in Government on TA (World Bank, 2004):   
The December 2000 elections in Ghana resulted in a change of government. As the new 
government settled in, familiar patterns become apparent. The new government fired 
hundreds of local government officials (appointed by the previous president) and laid off 
many senior public servants and army/security officers. The former government, now in 
opposition, developed an aggressive parliamentary style. A drive for political reform consequently 
emerged. This gave energy and momentum to improvements for parliamentary involvement in 
policymaking process and oversight in Ghana. 
World Bank’s Social Development Department and WBI studied the impact and sustainability of 
learning from WBI’s activities for parliamentarians around the world in 2003. More than half of the 
respondents for this study were from Ghana. In terms of the application and adaptation of 
learning, the Ghanaian MPs described that WBI capacity enhancement enabled them to 
participate in Parliamentary deliberations more effectively, and to play leadership roles in major 
development issues. Concerning development of communities of practitioners, the MPs also 
reported that the continuing contact they had with fellow alumni from the TA programme (e.g. 




3.7 Colombia: National Food and Nutrition Plan (PAN)7 
Description of TA programme/component: USAID (2019)   
USAID established the central Technical Assistance Bureau, with Nutrition among its additional 
technical offices in 1969 (Nutrition is now its own sector). USAID’s technical assistance has 
guided national food fortification programs in partner countries toward sustainability and 
self-reliance. USAID’s efforts in Colombia (through Technical Assistance and other schemes), is 
one of the most documented cases of all USAID assisted nutrition programmes. 
Colombia’s National Food and Nutrition Plan (Plan de Alimentación y Nutrición or PAN) epitomised 
USAID’s multi-sectoral nutrition planning philosophy. Developed in 1974 by Colombia’s National 
Planning Department and implemented by the responsible ministries, with political support from 
the Office of the President, PAN was designed to provide a wide range of services. These included 
rural credit, agricultural cooperatives and agroindustry to generate employment and increase 
incomes of low-income households; community health promoters to provide greater access to 
services; a well-targeted food coupon program based on a detailed Colombia poverty map; and 
improved access to clean water.  
Effect of Change in Government on TA: USAID (2019)   
A change of government in 1978 significantly weakened PAN, and the remaining, 
fragmented program closed four years later. Thus, PAN’s was terminated due to the 
desire of the subsequent government to establish ‘its own’ development strategies.  
Nevertheless, later analysis identified several explanations for the demise of PAN – 
beyond the change in government. One was an infringement on the autonomy of sectoral 
ministries, which got little supplemental funding. Others were the lack of local structures and 
commitment, and the lack of civil society support, including the insufficient political organisation 
and power of the low-income groups benefiting most from the program. 
USAID (2019) noted that Similar problems affected multi-sectoral nutrition planning units 
in other countries; the development sectors were not reorienting their activities and resources 
for nutrition. The units were accordingly deemed unsuccessful and began disappearing. Starting 
around 1985, USAID nutrition programming restricted its focus to the highly targeted, evidence-
based interventions within the health sector that could save the most lives for the least cost – for 
instance vitamin A supplementation, consistent with USAID’s Child Survival Initiative. 
 
                                                   
7 Plan de Alimentación y Nutrición 
12 
 
3.8 Georgia: Advancing National Integration  
Description of TA programme/component: USAID (2014)       
The Advancing National Integration (ANI) programme was intended to address several 
development challenges that are pervasive in Georgian society and are principally problematic in 
areas of densely settled minority populations.  
Many Georgian citizens are not active in civic life and are secluded in regions far from the political 
and economic centers of Georgia. These tendencies are worse for members of ethnic minority 
groups. Ethnic minorities and ethnic Georgians alike often point to Georgian language skills as the 
main impairment to integration but there remain deep-seated issues around religion, culture and 
stereotypes. These issues can be lessened through direct continued interactions; yet in most 
regions, there is little contact between those belonging to different ethnic groups. 
Operations of institutions such as the Tolerance Center (TC) and two Council of Religions (CR) 
are almost entirely dependent on financial support from ANI. Increased reliance on government 
funding could jeopardise the independence of the TC, therefore, international support 
continues to be essential to its efficacy as a watchdog body – especially considering recent 
transitions in government and uncertain levels of political will. The TC has played an 
important role in enhancing the capacity of the CR and, to a lesser extent, the Council of National 
Minorities (CNM). Both Councils are still relatively young with weak coalitions, which need ongoing 
financial and technical assistance. 
USAID’s 2014 evaluation noted that mechanisms should be explored for more recurrent progress 
monitoring of the new National Concept and Action Plan for Tolerance and Civic Integration 
(NCAP) by both the government and civil society. The programme evaluation also advised that 
ANI and USAID should advocate for essential changes to be endorsed by government and deliver 
technical assistance to the government. 
Effect of Change in Government on TA: USAID (2014)     
USAID’s 2014 evaluation found minimal effects of the 2012 change of government on the 
project. Informants indicated that the United Nations Association in Georgia (UNAG) and ANI 
staff has had cordial and cooperative relations with the government – both before and after the 
elections. 
The change of government has had no observable effect on ‘project effectiveness’. This is 
credited to the diplomacy efforts of UNAG, although it is no doubt also influenced by the positive 
relations of the government with USAID. Support by projects such as ANI sends the message to 
the government that these mechanisms and processes, which are not yet firmly institutionalised, 
are important in the eyes of the international community. 
Project implementers have worked hard to sustain good relations with the government, 
both before and after the 2012 transition. Those efforts have been largely successful. 
However, collaboration with Georgia Public Broadcasting has been impeded by a series of 
upheavals and changes of direction within the state media body.  
ANI staff report that they have worked steadily to establish links with new government 
officials since the elections. This, they note, has cost some time and effort, especially of 
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senior staff. Informants from various sectors uniformly indicated that UNAG/ANI staff has had 
cordial and cooperative relations with the government, both before and after the elections.  
The positive relationship is also the result of the new government’s acceptance of ANI 
technical assistance in monitoring NCAP and in preparing the new NCAP to take effect in 
2014. However, one informant mentioned that the new government’s commitment to NCAP 
was not guaranteed, since there had been no public or formal statement made in support of the 
process. Another commented that some ministries had been “uncooperative” in developing the 
new NCAP.  
Further, the change of government did result in some discussion of eliminating the 
Tolerance Centres, according to informants, and relations are not yet as strong as they 
were with the previous government. Some informants assert that the Council of National 
Minorities and Council of Religions are considered threats by certain factions within the 
new government. 
4. Case Studies: Regional TA Programmes & Change of 
Government 
4.1 Latin America & the Caribbean: German Bilateral Technical 
Cooperation 
Description of TA programme (GIZ and ECLAC, 2016):   
Since 2010, the main thematic focuses of German Bilateral Technical Cooperation in the Latin 
America & the Caribbean (LAC) region have been fiscal policy, structural policy, energy 
efficiency/renewable energy and climate change policy, and social protection. The three main 
programmes are: 
 Sustainable development and social cohesion in Latin America and the Caribbean (known 
as the 2010-2012 programme) with a budget of 3.5 million euros. 
 Promotion of low carbon development and social cohesion in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (known as the 2012-2014 programme) with a budget of 2.725 million euros. 
 Structural change for sustainable and inclusive development in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (known as the 2014-2016 programme) with a budget of 4 million euros. 
Some examples of TA within the German technical cooperation in the LAC region include the 
following: 
 The Cooperation provided TA to the Office of the Superintendent of Tax Administration 
(SAT) of Guatemala, in setting up a new division devoted explicitly to transfer prices. This 
work was carried out in cooperation with Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations 
(CIAT) and staff training in the formulation of fiscal regulations relating to transfer prices 
was delivered in collaboration with the programme “Good Fiscal Governance” of GIZ-
Guatemala. 
 Policy advice was given to Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Paraguay 




 TA to the Ministry for Social Development was given in Uruguay for the creation of an 
Integrated National Care System (with the focus on childcare and care for older people). 
Comparable support was provided to the Ministry for Family Affairs in Costa Rica, with 
recommendations for the formulation of the law on early childhood development and 
care. 
 Within a relatively short time, the TA resulted in the launch of specific public initiatives for 
strengthening and investing in value chains, specifically in Guatemala with the support of 
government officials at the highest level. In El Salvador, though, lack of training among 
technical staff limited the scope of TA. Mid- and high-level officials were not able to fully 
absorb and transfer the methodology. This resulted in reduced ownership. Furthermore, 
the Ministry of Economy lacks the resources and capacity to implement the 
Commission’s recommendations and to develop and promote value chains.  
Overall, German TA in LAC countries has gained importance, and governments in the region are 
showing growing interest and demand, far beyond the response capacities of the Cooperation. 
While TA is highly valued as a form of intervention, it is the combination of products and services 
that shows effectiveness and the most potential for achieving sustainable results and 
transformations. 
Effect of Change in Government on TA (GIZ and ECLAC, 2016):   
External factors such as a change of government or a restructuring of government 
priorities have been a risk throughout the Cooperation and threatened programme 
outcomes. However, the flexibility of the Cooperation and its programmes and recognition of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)’s role as a 
neutral think tank assisted to alleviate risks and negative effects, shifting activities to another 
country or re-establishing topics on the agenda with new authorities. In this context, GIZ country 
offices proved to be an essential ally for some divisions, providing first-hand knowledge of 
countries’ priorities and real needs, and facilitating relationships with national stakeholders. 
As GIZ and ECLAC (2016) note, National ownership, sustained political will (e.g. across 
successive governments) and commitment to the activities were not always present in the 
Cooperation initiatives. Their deficiency/non-existence undermines the applicability, let 
alone the sustainability of the initiative. Gender activities, for instance, were not pursued 
after the change of government in Costa Rica due to a lack of political will and 
commitment. In some cases, the countries have limited resources to dedicate to competing 
priorities and in others, such as regional integration in the energy sector and in social protection, 
the level of maturity needed to embark on certain activities was not yet in place. 
GIZ and ECLAC (2016) also note that the sustainability of interventions requires 
consolidated relationships with counterparts, based on trust, open communication and 




4.2 South Asia & East Africa: Innovative Ventures and 
Technologies for Development (INVENT) 
Description of TA programme/component: (INVENT Business Case, 2013 & 
INVENT Project completion Review, 2014)   
The INVENT programme backed technological and business innovations for the benefit of the 
poor in the low-income states of India and countries in South Asia and East Africa. It was 
approved in August 2013 to invest up to £38m over 6 years. 
Key Technical Assistance components of the programme include: 
 £7.5m technical assistance to share and replicate successful innovations from India 
to low income countries (LICs). 
 £3.5m technical assistance to support knowledge-sharing on inclusive innovations 
between India and low-income countries.  
 
Effect of Change in Government on TA: (INVENT Business Case, 2013 & 
INVENT Project completion Review, 2014)   
With the change in the government of India in 2014, the programme component ‘India 
Inclusive Innovation Fund’ (IIIF) – which was seen as high priority and transformational 
by the previous government – has fallen low on priority and may not take off at all. The 
fund was approved by the cabinet committee but has not been established due to political 
changes in the government of India.  
Due to the delay in the launch of IIIF  and the possibility that the fund may not be launched in 
the current form and structure (due to change in government), the programme team has 
worked on a back-up plan – including a ‘Fund of Fund’ option (as a mitigation strategy) as 
highlighted in the Business case. The team also met with the Secretary of Micro Small and 
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